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Nobody to play with?
The implications of leisure coordination
Abstract
We hypothesize that an individual’s time use choices are contingent on the time use choices
of others because the utility derived from leisure time often benefits from the presence of
companionable others inside and outside the household. We develop a model of time use, and
demonstrate that its consistency with the behaviour of British working couples in the 1990s.
We present evidence of the synchronisation of working hours by spouses and report estimates
indicating that propensities to engage in associative activity depend on the availability of
Suitable Leisure Companions outside the household. Our results indicate the importance of
externalities in the working time decisions of individuals.
JEL classification numbers: D13, I31, J221
1. Introduction
The hypothesis of this paper is that an individual’s time use choices may be
contingent on the time use choices of others, because the utility derived from leisure time
often benefits from the presence of companionable others. We develop this idea using a
model of time use, and show that it is consistent with the behaviour of British working
couples in the 1990s.
Although the labour supply literature has often started from the premise that
individuals maximize the utility they derive from their non-work time and their own
consumption of market goods, time spent in isolation is, for most people, only pleasurable in
small doses. Many of the things that people do in their non-work time (from bowling to
choral singing) involve other people, and are distinctly more pleasurable if done with others;
indeed many things (such as playing cricket or poker) are impossible without others.
However, the huge variety of leisure tastes that people have means that individuals face the
problem of locating Suitable Leisure Companions – ‘somebody to play with’ – and of
scheduling simultaneous free time. Consequently, if paid work absorbs more of other
people’s time, each person will find their own leisure time scheduling and matching problem
more difficult to solve (i.e. their leisure hours will be of less utility). As a result, there is an
externality to individual labour supply choices that implies the possibility of multiple,
sometimes Pareto-inferior, labour market equilibria.
The standard household labour supply model would frame this issue in terms of the
leisure time of husbands and wives being complementary goods (see Killingsworth,
1983:32). And as Hamermesh (2002:621), for example, has found for the USA, there is ‘clear
evidence that couples arrange their work schedules to allow time for leisure that they
consume jointly’. We provide new British evidence of such synchronisation of working
hours.
1 However we also go further and examine empirically the co-ordination of leisure
activities with others outside the household, using direct measures of associational activity as
indicators of the availability of Suitable Leisure Companions outside the household. Our
results can therefore help to explain the trends in associational life and social capital stressed
by Putnam (2000).
We begin with a theoretical model that illustrates why one might expect to observe
interdependence of time use choices among individuals (Section 2). This model implies that2
one would expect substantial interdependence in labour supply choices and leisure time usage
among spouses. We extend the model to argue that the leisure time choices of household
members will also depend on the opportunities for associational life that exist outside the
household.
Our empirical analysis of the labour supply and associational activities of working
couples follows. After discussion of our British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data
(Section 3), we present preliminary evidence indicating that, across British regions, the
likelihood of associational activity for persons of a given age group depends on the
percentage of persons in other age groups that also engage in that activity (Section 4). We
then provide new evidence about the synchronisation and scheduling of spousal work time,
and of dependence of an individual’s engagement in associational activity on the working
time and leisure activity decisions of others, both inside and outside the household (Sections
5 and 6). The implications of our arguments are discussed in Section 7.
2. Leisure coordination and labour supply
Although one can choose to be alone, relatively few leisure activities are intrinsically
asocial. Most leisure activities can be arranged on a continuum of ‘teamness’, and most of
them are distinctly more pleasurable if done with others.
2 Playing softball or soccer are
activities that make no sense if done alone. Singing to oneself may be something done in the
shower, but singing with a choir is generally a different level of experience. Even growing
roses or going for a walk or watching television is usually more pleasurable if done with
someone else or with a club. Reading a novel is certainly solitary, but many people also like
to talk about it afterwards, either formally in a book club or informally with friends over
dinner. To list these activities is to underscore the variety of leisure tastes that individuals
                                                                                                                                                       
1 Other studies of work time synchronisation, all based on based on time use surveys, include Hallberg (2003,
for Sweden), Sullivan (1996, Britain), and van Velzen (2001, Netherlands).
2 Corneo (2001) contrasted privately consumed leisure time (TV watching) and socially enjoyed leisure (which
requires investment in relationships). Our approach differs, since we argue that although solo television
watching is certainly feasible, companionship may nonetheless increase the utility derived from the activity, and
we want to model more explicitly the constraints involved in locating Suitable Leisure Companions. However,
his model is consistent with ours in spirit and implications. Weiss (1996) examined the co-ordination of working
hours. His model could be relabelled to explain the co-ordination of leisure hours and is, in this sense, consistent
with ours, but he does not consider work and leisure jointly. Winston (1982) is a pioneering study of the timing
of economic activities per se. Our emphasis on the importance of sociability for choice has some similarities
with discussion of ‘relational goods’ by Uhlaner (1989). Juster has compared the self-reports of satisfaction
derived from 25 specific activities (including jobs and types of housework and leisure) and has argued that, in
general, ‘activities that involve interaction tend to have high process benefit scores’ (1985:21).  Seventy years3
have, which creates the problem of locating ‘somebody (similar) to play with’, and
scheduling the simultaneous free time to do so.
If paid work absorbs more of other people’s time, each person will find their own
leisure time scheduling and matching problem more difficult to solve. If a general increase in
working time means that bird watching clubs close because everybody is too busy to organize
outings and chess clubs fold because people don’t go anymore, then the marginal utility of
the leisure time of bird watchers and chess players will decline. Since both formally
organized activities (like bowling leagues) and informal matching (such as the chances of
picking up a singles game at the tennis club) depend on how many other like-minded people
have free time, at the same time, the marginal utility of leisure time of each person is
conditional on how many hours other people are working, and when.
2.1 A model of the division of time between work time, and solo and social leisure time
Traditional labour supply theory starts, in a one period model, with each individual
maximizing a utility function, as in equation (1):
U = u(C, L)( 1 )
where C represents consumption and L represents non-work time. In this paper, we will work
with the more general formulation of a two person household, and use the subscripts m and f
to represent the individual partners. Since one can reduce the unitary household model to an
individual model by simply deleting either the ‘m’ or the ‘f’  terms, nothing is lost and
generality is gained by presenting a household model.
Total consumption of goods by the household can be divided into the privately
consumed goods of each partner and their joint consumption of household public goods i.e. C
= Cm + Cf + Cp. There is a large literature, for example Lam (1988), discussing the impact of
this division of household income on labour supply but, for present purposes, we do not need
to distinguish between types of consumption goods. All that we need to assume is that there
is a sharing rule for household goods consumption and that the utility of a couple is positively
affected by an increase in aggregate consumption. In this context, if married couples jointly
maximize household utility, in a unitary model of decision making, then (1C) represents the
appropriate maximand:
U = u(C, Lm, Lf). (1C)
                                                                                                                                                       
ago, Frank Knight (1933:3) also emphasized that the purpose of economic activity was as a prerequisite to the
enjoyment of ‘the intercourse of friends in ‘aimless’ camaraderie’.4
In this model, the wage rate(s) available in the paid labour market (w) and the total
time available for hours of paid work (H) and non-work time (L) are seen as the fundamental
constraints.
3 For a couple with unitary decision-making, the constraints are expressed by (2C)
and (3C):
Hm  +  Lm  = Hf  +  Lf  = T (2C)
C  ≤  wmHm  + wfHf. (3C)
By contrast with the conventional model, let us now suppose that individuals can
spend their non-work time either alone or in social leisure.
4 We denote the non-work hours
spent alone as A and the non-work time spent in social leisure as S.
Suppose further that in order to enjoy social leisure, each individual must arrange a
leisure match with some other individual (or group of individuals) from among the list of
possible contacts that they have at the start of each period. We assume as well that before
arranging their social life, individuals have to commit to a specific duration and timing of
their work hours.
5 In this model, individuals decide how many hours they want to work, and
must start each period by making a commitment to a specific number of work hours, at
specific times. This determines household money income, which together with the sharing
rule of their household determines the utility from material consumption.  However, at the
start of the period, the utility to be derived from social life is uncertain because the search
process for Suitable Leisure Companions involves uncertainty, since some desired matches
may not be feasible. Time spent alone, and not working, is the residual after work and social
commitments are honoured.
Total utility experienced during the period will be given by (4C) for a couple with
unitary decision-making:
U = u(C, Am, Af, Sm0, Sm1, …, Smn, Sf0, Sf1, …, Sfn′) (4C)
where A represents non-work time spent alone, and S represents social leisure. We use the
subscripts m and f to denote the different partners and adopt the convention that the social
leisure time each partner spends with each other is denoted as 0 (hence Sm0 = Sf0).  Other
                                                
3 Clearly, this formulation assumes that work hours are available without quantity constraint at a constant real
wage, without progressive taxation. Non-labour income (from capital or transfer payments) is assumed to be
zero, and any complications of human capital investment through on the job training are ignored.
4 We shall ignore issues of time spent in household production in order to focus on the leisure time dimension.
Alternatively, one can think of household production choices as being part of H, and the goods produced by
household labour as part of C.
5 To keep things simple, we assume that the process of arranging one’s social life takes no time at all, even if its
results are uncertain, ex ante, at the start of each period (one could call this a ‘speed dialling’ assumption). We
assume below that one of the benefits of living in a couple is joint access to social contacts: each partner now
has a contact list equal to km + kf .5
social matches are subscripted by 1,…,n and 1,…,n′  where n and n′  are the number of realized
social leisure matches for each partner.
Our model is, therefore, a generalization of the traditional model, and the traditional
model can be seen as nested within it. In the traditional model, it is only the total amount of
non-work time (the sum of social and solo leisure) that matters: the division of that time
between time spent with others and time spent alone is irrelevant.
6 A testable implication is
that, in any regression in which time-use explanatory variables appear, coefficients on
corresponding social leisure time and solo leisure time variables should be identical.
Consider now the solution to the extended model. The problem with wanting to have
a social life is that one cannot do it unilaterally: arranging a social life involves a search
process which is constrained by the social contacts available to each person, and by the
availability of other people. We can denote the list of such social contacts at each point in
time as k for an individual person and the contacts of each couple as km + kf. One can think of
each match with a possible Suitable Leisure Companion from a person’s list of contacts as
having a given level of utility associated with it but, in order for there to be a match, both
parties must agree on its timing, duration and purpose.
7 Social leisure therefore comes in
discrete engagements, and it is not certain – at the point in time when the individual must
commit to a given number and timing of work hours – which social matches will prove
feasible.
8
Denote the probability that a specific leisure match will be feasible by pi, where the
subscript i indexes the identities of possible Suitable Leisure Companions, and the utility
associated with that match as u(Si).
9 The expected utility of a specific social leisure match is
then given by piu(Si). Single individuals will then maximize their expected utility as in (5),
while unitary couples will maximize (5C):
                                                
6 Taken literally, this implies that, with a given amount of consumption goods and work time, a person’s utility
level would be unaffected were they to be deprived of social leisure altogether.
7 When utility from a possible contact falls short of the reservation utility of being alone, no match will be
sought with those individuals.
8 One can think of each potential social match as involving some implicit bargaining between the participants as
to duration. In this paper we do not need to enquire as to the solution algorithm. It could be Nash bargaining or
determined by some other mechanism, such as social norms of protocol. All that is needed for this paper is that
the duration cannot be unilaterally determined by both parties, which implies that individuals typically cannot
equate exactly the marginal utility of social leisure time and their reservation utility of time. This implies that
individuals compare the average utility per hour of a social leisure time match with their reservation price of
time, which can be thought of as the ‘I would have liked to have left half an hour ago but, on the whole, I’m
glad I attended’ phenomenon.
9 Without loss of generality one could index potential matches by timing, duration, and purpose, as well as by
the identity of the other leisure companions.6
max Ε (U)   =   u(C) + Σ i∈ k piu(Si)   +  uA[T – H – Σ i∈ k piu(Si)] (5)
max Ε (U)    = u(Cf) + u(Cm) + pi0[um(S0) + uf(S0)]
+ Σ i∈ km+kf { pimum(Sim) + pifuf(Sif)}
+ uAm[T –  Hm  –   pi0uf(Si0)  –  Σ i∈ km+kf  pimum(Sim) ]
+ uAf[T –  Hf  –   pi0um(Si0)  –  Σ i∈ km+kf  pifuf(Sif) ]
(5C)
where uAm and uAf are the utilities of non-work time spent alone.
To illustrate how our model compares with the traditional model, consider first how
an individual’s labour supply decision is usually pictured. In the traditional model, the graph
summarising the marginal utility of time derived from paid work (i.e. the marginal utility of
the consumption goods enabled by paid work) is drawn to represent the assumption that paid
work hours are continuously available and can be decided with certainty at the start of each
period.
10 Since there are assumed to be only two possible uses of total time, the hours of work
decision directly determines hours of leisure time, whose utility is also known with certainty.
Both goods consumption and leisure time are assumed to have diminishing marginal utility,
so utility is maximized when the marginal utility of time used for work and for leisure is
equal, and one can denote the implied optimal labour supply as H* hours.
In our model, the returns to paid work are represented in exactly the same way as in
the traditional model, and as implying the same amount of paid working time (H*) – our
interest is in examining the implications of social and solitary ways of spending non-work
time. Since we assume that each period must be started with a decision about working hours,
this decision determines total hours of non-work time, and we assume that households will
try to maximize the utility to be derived from any given amount of non-work time by
comparing the utility to be derived from solo and social leisure time.
Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic treatment of the choice process in our model. It
represents the (household’s) utility derived from the allocation of time for each individual in
a household – we do not replicate the analogous figure that could be drawn for each other
household member. (Accordingly, the m and f subscripts are dropped from now on.) In a
unitary model of household labour supply the relevant marginal utility of leisure, and of
consumption, are defined by the household’s utility function. (In a model of individual labour7
supply, the structure of the model is identical, but the relevant utility function is that of the
individual.)
<Figure 1 near here>
In order for a decision about total work hours (H*) to be optimal, the expected
marginal utility of all three uses of time (work, solo leisure and social leisure) must be equal
for each individual in the household. The optimal ex ante division of time between desired
solo and social leisure is pictured in the right hand side of Figure 1. We assume a given set of
decisions by other people as to their working hours, which determines the probability vector
pi defining the chances that specific leisure matches will be feasible. This determines in turn,
for each individual, the marginal utility of social leisure function MUS. The diminishing
marginal utility of solo leisure is represented by the line labelled MUA.
In order to indicate the uncertainty of the search process for Suitable Leisure
Companion(s), dashed lines are used. The marginal utility of social leisure is drawn in
discrete steps to represent the idea that because social leisure time must, by definition,
involve an agreement with others about the duration of time to be spent together, it will
typically come in discrete lumps. Clearly there is a hierarchy in the expected utility to be
derived from specific possible leisure matches, and the downward slope of the MUS function
represents the idea that potential social matches can be ordered by their expected utility.
Matches at the top of the steps of the MUS function represent social engagements with highest
expected utility, whereas social matches on the bottom steps (where MUS is below u*)
correspond to engagements that would be rejected as having less expected utility than time
spent alone.
The MUS function is conditional on the labour supply decisions of others, and on the
own labour supply decision made at the start of each period. Utility-maximizing couples will
want to choose the division of total time which equates (as nearly as possible) the marginal
utility that the household derives from working, and from social leisure and solo leisure time.
Hence, Figure 1 is drawn to illustrate the equilibrium condition that MUH*  = MUA* = MUS*.
The issue we want to stress is the problem of arranging a social life. Our model
summarizes this problem in terms of the probability of finding a feasible leisure match with
some other specific Suitable Leisure Companion(s), the statistic pi. That probability depends
on the amount of time potentially available, i.e. when neither party to the potential match is
                                                                                                                                                       
10 For our present purposes, we can assume either a constant money wage per hour with diminishing marginal
utility to additions to material consumption, and/or that the marginal productivity (and wage) of each worker
decline with greater working hours.8
committed to working. Since the timing and the duration of their mutual engagement cannot
overlap with the working time of either party, pi is clearly negatively associated with both
own work hours (H), and the work hours of Suitable Leisure Companion i that do not overlap
with the own work hours (Hin).
11 Together H and Hin characterise the time available for a
match:
pi =  g(H + Hin)( 6 )
where g′ (H) < 0, and g′ (Hin) < 0.
Longer work hours, or less co-ordinated work hours, by other people both imply a
decline in pi (the probability of a specific match being successful) and hence a decline in the
expected utility of specific leisure matches pi u(Si). For present purposes, we can assume that
the marginal utility derived from the consumption enabled by own working hours (MUH)
remains unchanged. However, if the probability of arranging good leisure matches falls, then
the marginal utility of social leisure time (MUS) will decline. This is represented in Figure 1
by the downward shift to the new schedule labelled MUS′.
12
Given the equilibrium condition MUH*  =  MUA*  =  MUS*, and the decline in the
marginal utility of social leisure time (MUS′), our model predicts that one’s own hours of
work increase from H* to H**. This implies that, in Figure 1, the marginal utility of solo
leisure schedule (MUA) shifts to the right, but its shape remains the same (since nothing has
happened that would affect the pleasures of a marginal hour of solitary leisure).
Our model does not presume that social leisure always generates more utility than
solo leisure, just that it sometimes does. (Since it is easy to observe people voluntarily
choosing social leisure, this hypothesis seems obvious to us.) Given that proposition, our
model predicts unambiguously that an individual’s working time will increase and social
leisure time will decrease, when social leisure time becomes harder to arrange, as others work
more hours, or work more inconvenient hours. However, we do not have clear predictions
                                                
11 Since some people are in ‘on-call’ work situations or have jobs with involuntary overtime or rotating shifts,
one should really think of ‘hours available for work’, rather than ‘hours actually worked’ in analysing
scheduling issues. Equation (6) writes the probability of a successful leisure match as dependent only on the
time available to each potential pair of leisure companions. This ignores any capital or other inputs required for
a specific leisure activity (e.g. squash court availability) and the consequent possibility of short run congestion
effects in leisure industries. If leisure activities require capital inputs and if there were a general decline in
working hours, greater congestion in leisure facilities would be likely to produce both some substitution of
activities and capital inflow. Strictly speaking, (6) represents the probability of a specific (marginal) leisure
match. We leave the specification of a full model of the leisure production function, and the supply of leisure
facilities, to further work.
12 There is no necessary reason to assume that all potential leisure matches are affected by a general increase in
the work hours, or work scheduling, of others. All that matters is that the marginal leisure match is affected.
Hence Figure 1 is drawn so that MUS  = MUS′  over an initial range.9
about the absolute or relative amount of solo leisure. Total time is equal to working time plus
solo leisure plus social leisure (T = H + A + S), and when the expected utility of a leisure
match (piu(Si)) falls, working time increases (H** > H*) and social leisure time falls (S** <
S*). The time spent in leisure alone is the time which is left over after the satisfaction of work
and social commitments: A**= T–H**–S** and A*= T–H*–S*. However, we cannot predict
whether solo leisure time increases or decreases, relatively or absolutely, until we know the
size of H**–H* and S**–S*.
Our model is more general than that of Hamermesh (2002), who examined the time
use decisions of couples concerning work and non-work time, since we are trying to model
social leisure spent within and outside the household. Hamermesh concluded that time spent
together is a normal good for couples that will increase as full income (hourly wages)
increases. This is not a necessary implication of our framework. Although we know that the
sum of the pure income effects on market work time, solo leisure, and social leisure, must be
zero (since total time must be allocated to one of these three activities), the model of (5) and
(5C) is written with such generality that one cannot use it to predict which goods are normal,
and which inferior.
Moreover, if hourly wages increase, total working hours may increase or decrease,
depending on whether income or substitution effects dominate. Whether or not the
proportionate importance of social leisure, S/(A+S), increases or not as total non-work time,
A+S, increases or decreases cannot be determined by theory alone. In terms of Figure 1, we
know that both the MUA and MUS schedules are downward sloping, but we need to know
their relative slopes, and the slope of MUH, in order to know if synchronized leisure is a
normal good.
There is nothing new in the idea that, as one’s own hours of work increase, the total
time available for leisure falls. When solitary leisure becomes scarcer, the marginal utility of
non-work time spent alone will, ceteris paribus, increase. However, we argue that labour
supply decisions also reflect the impact of working hours on social life, i.e. that longer work
hours will diminish the probability of finding feasible and desirable leisure matches, which
implies a decline in the utility derived from social leisure. The net change in utility from non-
work time is the sum of these two effects.
The novel point that we wish to stress is that, ceteris paribus, when other persons
increase their hours of paid work, the probability of a feasible and desirable leisure match
with oneself falls, which decreases the personal utility of non-work time. In addition, for any
given level of total hours of labour supply by each person, greater mismatch between the10
timing of hours of work will reduce the probability of a social leisure time match being
feasible and will lower the utility of non-work time. By reducing the utility of non-work time,
both effects increase desired hours of paid work. Thus in general the desired supply of labour
of each person will be conditional on their expectations of the labour supply decisions of
others.
In (5C), the third term is the utility derived from spouses spending time together. As
many working couples will attest, finding the time to do that may not be a trivial exercise, an
issue which we examine empirically in Section 5. The subsequent terms of (5C) refer to the
leisure matches that individuals make outside the household. These are the focus of Sections
4 and 6.
2.2 Interdependencies in time use within the household
A primary candidate for a Suitable Leisure Companion is one’s spouse. Indeed, most
people would argue that the joint enjoyment of non-work time, and the pleasure of one
another’s company, is a prime reason why people get married in the first place. However, the
economic perspective on marriage has typically emphasized something quite different,
namely the linkage of individuals through the material benefits of marriage in joint
consumption of household public goods (Lam, 1988) and the gains from trade arising from a
division of labour between household and market production (e.g. Becker, 1991; Weiss,
1997; Ermisch, 2003). Both these economic perspectives imply interdependence in time use
decisions among spouses, albeit from different motivations. But both link the behaviour of
spouses through the aggregate budget constraint on the consumption of material goods
(which depends on the aggregate hours of work of both partners), and ignore the possibility
that couples might want to spend time together.
Our hypothesis is that the time-use decisions of individuals are contingent on the time use
choices of others, because many leisure activities are not nearly as much fun if one does them
alone. However, our problem is to distinguish this hypothesis from other sources of time use
interdependence. The economic perspective on marriage already predicts that the aggregate
non-work time of each partner in intact households is linked via the household budget
constraint, which conditions the household’s potential consumption of local public goods and
its division of consumption of private goods. Similarly, although our hypothesis predicts that
marital dissolution (through either death or divorce) will alter the availability of a Suitable
Leisure Companion, and thereby alter the marginal utility of leisure, such an event will also
affect the time usage of the surviving spouse through the associated change in the household11
budget constraint. The income effect of household dissolution is the net impact of loss of
money income and the change in household economies of scale in aggregate consumption.
That income effect on the behaviour of the surviving spouse may be positive or negative for
aggregate non-work time, or for specific usages of such time.
Since one might reasonably expect that individuals with similar (unobservable)
preferences in either or both of leisure time usage or material consumption are more likely to
match up as marriage partners, we expect to observe a correlation across spouses in the type
of non-work activity they engage in – but this is not really the point we want to make. Rather,
our argument is that, conditional on preferences for type of activity and the aggregate amount
of work and leisure time, individual spouses may derive utility from spending non-work time
together. Hence we expect to observe a synchronisation in the timing of working hours, for
any given level of working hours. (I.e. if one presumes that individuals have some scope for
decision making over the timing of work hours and that couples communicate, they can
coordinate to increase pm0 and pf0.)
3. The data and key variables
3.1 The British Household Panel Survey and the analysis sample
Our research is based on data from waves 1 to 9 of the BHPS (Taylor et al., 2002),
covering survey years 1991–1999. The BHPS is a good resource for our analysis given its
extensive range of time-use variables in addition to standard household survey variables, and
we can use the repeated observations on panel respondents to control for unobserved
individual effects.
Our empirical analysis focuses on working couples. Although the hypothesis about
the impact on leisure time choices of the availability of Suitable Leisure Companions outside
the household also applies to single people, we focus on couples here for brevity’s sake. (Our
empirical modelling can be seen, therefore, as a relatively stiff test of the hypothesis
concerning the impact of extra-household externalities, as they will have to reveal themselves
in addition to the expected spousal interaction effects.) More specifically, we considered
respondents with a full interview, living with a partner (married or cohabiting), with both
partners aged 18–59 years, and both in paid employment at the time of the interview (neither
partner  self-employed). Pooling the data from the nine waves resulted in an unbalanced
panel of almost 10,000 couple-year observations from just under 2,500 couples. This sample
is more than twice as large as any time use survey sample used in previous analysis of work-12
time synchronisation. (Hallberg, 2003, for example, used information on about 1000 Swedish
couples.)
3.2 Key variables
For information about couple’s synchronisation and scheduling of paid work hours,
we used the BHPS question that asks: ‘At what time of the day do you usually work? Is it: 1
mornings only; 2 afternoons only; 3 during the day; 4 evenings only; 5 at night; 6 both
lunch/evenings; 7 other times/day; 8 rotating shifts; 9 varies/no pattern; 10 other; or 11
daytimes & evenings’.
13,14
This variable is used in Section 5 to examine the propensities of a husband and wife to
be working at the same time of day, defined to mean that each spouse reported the same code.
We also used the variable to construct measures of the prevalence of unsocial work hours
worked in the region in which the respondent lives. For each of the 18 geographic regions
identified in the BHPS, we calculated the pooled-data proportion of employed men reporting
that they usually worked rotating shifts or work time varied (codes 8 and 9 above). An
analogous variable was created for women. We think of the unsocial hours variables as
controlling for the structure of local labour market demand, i.e. the local prevalence of firms
whose operations are more profitable if capital can be kept occupied at all hours of the day or
whose markets need servicing at unsocial hours. We expect that the greater the prevalence of
unsocial hours, the less likely that husbands and wives can synchronize their work times, and
the less likely their propensities to be active in associative activities.
For our measures of associative activity, we concentrate on reported activity in a
sports club, and in a social group or working men’s club. At waves 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9, BHPS
respondents were asked if they were active in any of the organisations listed on a showcard
and then, if so, which one. (In a separate question, respondents were asked if they were a
member of any of the organisations listed and then, if so, which one.) The showcard listed the
following organisations, with percentages of individuals in the analysis sample that were
                                                
13 From waves 2 to 4, this question was not asked of employees still in the same job as in the previous year. For
these waves, responses were imputed from the previous waves’ values. A new category (11 daytimes and
evenings) was recoded at wave 5 from the category ‘other’, and formally incorporated into the questionnaire
from wave 6 onwards.
14 Our work synchronisation measure is less detailed than the one provided in the US Current Population Survey
data used by Hamermesh (2002) or in time use surveys (Hallberg, 2003; Sullivan, 1996; van Velzen, 2001). In
these cases, the data enable one to say whether, at each hour during the day, two spouses were working or not.
The time use survey samples are smaller than those from population surveys like the CPS and BHPS, but have
the advantage that one can investigate whether spouses who synchronise work and leisure hours spend that time
with each other. See Hallberg (2003) and Sullivan (1996).13
active shown in parentheses: social group or working men’s club (12 percent), sports club (24
percent), political party (1 percent), trade union (7 percent), professional organisation (3
percent), environmental group (2 percent), parents association (8 percent), tenants or
residents association (4 percent), religious group (9 percent), voluntary service group (3
percent), and a number of other groups (each less than 2 percent). We focus our empirical
work on sports clubs and social groups, the two organisations with the greatest prevalence of
activity, to reduce potential problems of sampling variability, particularly when disaggregated
by region and age group (see below). Parallel analyses that used the corresponding
membership variables produced very similar results.
The associative variables were also used to construct measures of the extra-household
availability of Suitable Leisure Companions for each relevant activity, separately for
husbands and wives and for three age groups (18–30, 31–50, 51–59 years). These measures
were used as explanatory variables in our models of propensities to engage in associative
activity (see Section 6). For each of the 18 British regions, and for each of the three age
groups, we calculated the number of persons in that age group who reported themselves to be
active, expressed as a proportion of all sample respondents in that age group (i.e. including
singles as well as couples, and regardless of employment status) in the pooled nine-wave data
set.
15
Our measure of work hours refers to hours usually worked (including overtime
hours), on a weekly basis. Because the BHPS does not ask about hourly wage rates, we
derived these from usual gross pay (converted from a monthly basis to a weekly basis),
divided by usual weekly work hours, and assumed that overtime was paid at time-and-a-half.
(Results based on an alternative hourly wage variable, derived assuming no overtime
premium, differed little and so are not reported.)
3.3 Control variables
To save space, we report regression estimates only for variables of principal interest
(full results are available on request). Control variables used, but with effects not reported,
were: the respondent’s age, the number of children in household aged less than 16 years and
whether the youngest child was aged less than six years, whether the respondent was
                                                
15 For organisations other than sports club and social clubs, i.e. those for which the underlying prevalence of
membership or activity was relatively low, the sample sizes available at the regional level were often tiny. Since
our measures of associative activity and unsocial hours were each calculated at the regional level, we are using a
coarse filter. Although it would have been preferable to have had measures of both at the neighbourhood level –14
cohabiting rather than legally married, the respondent’s educational qualifications (five
categories), and the survey year. To account for potential differences in labour demand (in
addition to the unsocial hours variables already mentioned), we also controlled for industry of
main job (distinguishing between the ten major Standard Industrial Classification groups),
and the unemployment rate in the local labour market (the so-called travel-to-work-area). To
account for differences in opportunities for individuals to socialise in their work place, we
controlled for differences in the number of employees working at the respondent’s workplace
(‘firm size’).
4. Preliminary evidence on extra-household interdependence
Because different households are typically not linked through the budget constraint –
either through the household production or consumption of material goods – a check for
linkages between households in leisure time usage is, in some senses, the cleanest test of our
hypothesis. However, before turning to the regression methods of Sections 5 and 6, it is
useful to enquire whether simpler methods of analyzing the data provide evidence consistent
with our basic perspective. We are arguing that each person’s time use choices are typically
contingent on the time use choices of others, because the marginal utility of each individual’s
leisure depends on the choices made by others. In particular, we argue that each person’s
likelihood of participating in associational life depends on what others in their local area have
chosen to do, both because one cannot join a club or association that does not exist for lack of
membership and because the more members these organizations have, the more attractive
they are to prospective members. If there is this positive externality, one can expect to
observe feedback effects on the local level of participation and membership: regions where a
larger fraction of people participate in associational life will be regions where clubs and
associations are more easily available, and more attractive to others. Conversely, fewer
people will want to participate in areas where associational life is more poorly developed.
Our strategy for examining this hypothesis is to use measures of the prevalence of
associative activity among different age groups as indicators of the relative health of
associational life in a local area and of the opportunities available. If there were no
externalities from the club or association participation for one age group (in the sense
described in the last paragraph), there would be no reason to expect activity or membership
                                                                                                                                                       
the closest BHPS approximation is the local authority – we did not use these because of the sampling variability15
among different age groups to be either higher or lower in the same local areas. However, if
there are externalities, one would expect club membership and activity among those other
groups to be positively associated with the associational life of the age group in question. In
this section we check this hypothesis, using data for three age groups: 18–30, 31–50, and 51–
59 years.
As Section 3 noted, the BHPS asked respondents both whether they were active in, or
members of, a sports club or a social or working men’s club. Among respondents aged 18–59
years, there was a substantial level of involvement – together with considerable variation
across the 18 British regions. Nationally, 24 percent of respondents reported that they were
active in a sports club, with a range from 17 percent in Tyne and Wear to just under 30
percent in Yorkshire and Humberside (other than West and South Yorkshire) and Scotland.
Activity in a social group or working men’s club was reported by 12 percent of respondents
nationwide, but by only 4 percent in inner London, compared to 16 percent in Tyne and
Wear.
Since the BHPS asks respondents separately about membership and activity, we had a
double index of the strength of associational life at the local level, and since these two
measures were highly correlated for each type of association, we have some confidence that
they both measure the same underlying propensity. Moreover, because social group
membership or activity was not particularly well correlated across regions with sports club
membership or activity, there is reason to believe that regional differences are not simply due
to differences in some sort of generalized local proclivity to associational life.
Since our hypothesis is that individuals are more likely to participate in these types of
groups in areas where many others already do, we expect to see a positive association
between the proportion of middle-aged respondents who reported activity and the percentage
of youth and older age groups who reported such activity. Figure 2a plots the association
between regional-average sports club activity rates among those aged 31–50 years and
regional-average sports club activity rates among those aged 18–30, whereas Figure 2b plots
the corresponding rates for activity in a social group or working men’s club. In both charts,
the regional data indicate a positive correlation between associative activity of one age group
and another, a finding that is consistent with our externality hypothesis. Corresponding charts
for membership rates (rather than activity rates) showed similar patterns.
<Figures 2a and 2b near here>
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5. The synchronisation of usual daily working time by British working couples
The proportion of the couples in our sample that usually worked at the same time of
the day, 51 percent, was greater than would be expected from a random match of a husband’s
and a wife’s work times (see Table 1, column 1). A Pearson test for the independence of
spousal work times had a test statistic F(63.26, 153014) = 4.55 with p-value = 0.0000. (The
test was based on a cross tabulation of spousal work times, and made appropriate adjustment
for the repeated observations on couples.) Arguably, however, this synchronisation could
simply reflect an ‘effect due to the inherent constraints on daily time-use imposed, for
instance, by the regularity of office hours, school hours, and the hours of darkness, and
leading to some necessary time co-ordination’ (Sullivan, 1996:85, emphasis in original).
To control for this effect, we used two methods. First we employed a matching
procedure to replace each of the sample’s working husbands with a working single man with
otherwise similar characteristics, and each working wife with a working single woman,
thereby generating a sample of ‘pseudo-couples’.
16 The work times of the members of each
pseudo-couple should reflect the inherent constraints on their time, and provide a baseline
against which synchronisation among real couples may be assessed. We found that 46 percent
of pseudo-couples had synchronised work times (Table 1, column 3). The degree of
synchronisation among real couples is some five percent larger, suggesting that there is a
significant albeit small coordination of work timing over and above that implied by inherent
constraints of daily life. In our second, more non-parametric, approach, we paired every
husband with every wife in the sample and computed the prevalence of synchronisation in
spousal work times. Among the 11,758,971 pairs, the rate was 46 percent. (The proportion
was virtually the same when each panel survey year was considered separately.) Again we
conclude that there exists genuine synchronisation of work times among working couples.
<Table 1 near here>
Table 1 also shows how synchronisation of spousal work times varied with husband’s
work time, and with the number of children. Observe first from columns 2 and 4 that the
marginal distributions for both real and pseudo-couples were very similar, which is an
                                                
16 Each single person used in the matching exercise was in employment and aged 18–59 (as in the sample of
couples). We used a propensity score matching procedure (1:1, without replacement), with the matching
variables being age (linear spline with eight knots), work hours (cubic), educational qualifications, number of
children in age groups 0–2, 3–4, 5–11, 12–15, 16–18, and BHPS survey year. Creation of baselines using
pseudo-couples generated by matching procedures has also been done by Sullivan (1996) and Hallberg (2003).17
indication that the matching procedure worked well. Some 72 percent of husbands usually
worked ‘during the day’, and just over 18 percent worked unsocial hours (‘rotating shifts’ or
‘varies/no pattern’). For two-thirds of the real husbands who usually worked during the day,
their wife’s work time was also usually during the day. For all other husbands, the chances of
his and her work times coinciding was substantially less than the average. In particular, only
about one in ten husbands working unsocial hours had a wife also working unsocial hours.
The degree of synchronisation among real couples is greater than that for pseudo-couples for
all categories of working time.
Spousal work time synchronisation is likely to be strongly influenced by whether or
not the couple has children. Particularly if children are young and family money income is
low, working at different times of the day may be seen as a way of saving the expense of
baby sitters, by enabling one parent to cover child care responsibilities while the other is at
work. (Alternatively, parents may forsake some synchronisation in their work times, so that
each of them can spend quality time with the children.) Evidence consistent with these
hypotheses is shown in the lower panel of Table 1. This shows a clear gradient in the
prevalence of spousal work time synchronisation. Among childless real couples, 60 percent
of husbands usually worked at the same time as their wives but, among couples with one
child, the proportion was only 48 percent. With two children or three children, the fractions
were lower still: 39 percent and 29 percent. In households with three or more children, the
degree of synchronisation in working time was less among real couples than among pseudo-
couples, as we would expect.
Table 2 reports the correlates of work time synchronisation using random effects
probit regressions, with separate models for couples with and without children. In each
model, the dependent variable is equal to one if a couple usually worked at the same time of
the day and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables on which we focus are, following
research such as Hamermesh (2002), the hourly wage rates and work hours of the husband
and wife, plus measures of the prevalence of the working of unsocial hours by men and
women in the region in which the couple lived. We used the panel data to control for
unobserved individual effects, assumed to be uncorrelated with the other regressors.
17
The associations between the synchronisation probability and each spouse’s wage
rate, holding each spouse’s work hours constant, are not clear cut. As Hamermesh (2002) has
                                                
17 We did not use fixed effects estimators in this paper because key explanatory variables such as the regional
measures of unsocial hours were derived from pooled-data averaging. Hence they did not vary across the panel,
and would not be able to be identified in a fixed effects model.18
argued, one might expect two opposing influences. On the one hand, higher wages ceteris
paribus may act like an increase in full earnings, and one might expect the income effect to
raise the work time synchronisation probability (a leisure-as-normal-good argument).
18 On
the other hand, a compensating differentials perspective would argue for a negative
association between wage rates and work time synchronisation, since husbands and wives
who wish to play together may be willing to accept a wage penalty in order to do so, or
employers may need to pay husbands and wives more in order to induce them to work at
different times.
<Table 2 near here>
There was a strong positive and statistically significant association between the wife’s
wage rate and the synchronisation propensity: the elasticity of the probability of
synchronisation with respect to her wage is 35 per cent for childless couples and 22 percent
for couples with children (elasticities evaluated at the means). By contrast, there was a
statistically significant association between the husband’s wage rate and the work time
synchronisation probability only among couples with children. The elasticity was 20 percent
in this case, and thus 50 percent smaller that the corresponding elasticity for the wife’s wage
rate. One might interpret the insignificant association between husband’s wage and
synchronisation among childless couples as either reflecting evidence of the compensating
differential effect offsetting the leisure-as-normal good effect, or it might just be that the
unitary model of household decision-making is less relevant when there are no children (see
footnote 18).
Holding wages constant, the more hours the wife worked, the more likely that spousal
work times were synchronised, for both childless couples and parents. The probability that
husband and wife work at the same time was, as might be expected, strongly associated with
whether or not the husband worked during the day (which is by far the most popular work
time). However, conditional on that, there was no association between a husband’s total
working hours and synchronisation. Perhaps because we have a relatively crude proxy for the
structure of labour demand, differences in the prevalence of working at unsocial hours in the
region in which the couple lived appear to have no statistically significant association with
work time synchronisation propensities.
                                                
18 The effect may not be so clear outside the confines of the unitary model of couple decision-making. In this
case, a husband may choose to spend his higher wage on time out on personal goods (time with ‘mates’) rather
than communal ones (joint leisure).19
Finally, among couples with children, there were marked differences in work
time synchronisation according to the number of children and the presence of a young child.
Other things being equal, each additional child reduced the probability of synchronisation by
about six percentage points, and having a child aged less than six reduced the probability by
about 11 percentage points. These are large effects given that the sample fraction of spouses
working at the same time was 42 percent, but they are consistent with previous findings that
having dependent children increased the chances of working mothers working at ‘unusual’
hours (and a different time from their husbands). See Hamermesh (1996) for Germany and
the USA, and van Velzen (2001) for the Netherlands.
Like Hamermesh (2002, Table 4), who used US Current Population Survey data for
the 1970s and 1980s, we found significant positive effects on synchronisation of a higher
wife’s wage rate. He also found an effect for the husband’s wage, though we found this only
among couples with children. However, Hamermesh also reported that husband’s work hours
were positively associated with synchronisation, whereas we found no effect (once we
controlled for whether the husband worked during the day). Thus there appear to be some
differences between the USA and 1990s Britain that could be investigated further in future
work.
6. Interdependence in associative activity propensities?
To model husbands’ and wives’ propensities for associative activity, we estimated
multivariate probit regression models for each couple i = 1,…, N, of the form
yim
*   =   β m′ Xim   +  ε im , m = 1, …, 4
yim   =   1  if  yim
*   >  0, and 0 otherwise
(7)
where the ε im are error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero,
and variance-covariance matrix V, where V  has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and
correlations ρ jk = ρ kj as off-diagonal elements.
19 The four equations characterise, for each
couple, the propensities of the husband and of the wife to be active in a social group or
working men’s club, and in a sports club.
                                                
19 The multivariate probit models were estimated using the method of simulated maximum likelihood with the
GHK simulator: see Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) for details. The panel structure of the dataset, implying
repeated observations on couples, means that the i.i.d. assumption underpinning standard maximum likelihood
methods is violated. We therefore used the method of maximum pseudo-likelihood described by Gourieroux and
Monfort (1996), an approach providing consistent parameter estimates, and adjusted standard errors using a
robust variance estimator that treated each couple as a cluster.20
Joint estimation of the four equations reflects the jointness of within-couple choices,
as assumed by the theoretical model proposed in Section 2. That model also implies that, in
any equation characterising the probability of a given associative activity for one partner in a
couple, variables summarising the other partner’s associative activities and both partners’
work hours are endogenous. These variables were excluded from the explanatory variable
vector for each equation (Xim), and their effects are captured by the cross-equation
correlations. We placed no prior restrictions on the correlation structure but our theoretical
model leads us to expect a positive correlation between the equations for husbands and wives
for the same activity (reflecting a desire to ‘play together’), though of course this may also
reflect selection into marriage (people marry those with whom they would like to spend their
free time).
The explanatory variables on which we focus are our measures of extra-household
availability of Suitable Leisure Companions, namely the regional-mean activity rates for each
of three age groups. We estimated (7) separately for each of three groups of couples, defined
in terms of the age of the husband (18–30, 31–50, and 51–59 years). In the model for a given
age group, we used as regressors the regional-mean activity rates of the other two age groups
in order to minimise any potential tautological connections between an individual’s activity
propensity and the propensities among those of the same age group.
20 Our model leads us to
expect positive coefficients on these variables.
The equations for each partner also included controls for own educational
qualifications, wage rate, firm size and industry of main job, and couple-specific variables:
the number of children aged less than 16, presence of a child aged less than six, whether the
couple were cohabiting rather than legally married, the local unemployment rate, the regional
prevalence of unsocial work hours, and survey year. Our explanatory variables encompass
most of those used in conventional models of participation in sport and recreation (see for
example Gratton and Taylor, 2000, chapter 5), but our inclusion of variables aiming to
summarise the availability of Suitable Leisure Companions is innovative.
The estimates of the models for age groups 18–30, 31–50, and 51–59, are reported in
Tables 3–5. Average activity rates in a social club and working men’s club were greater
among husbands than among wives, but were higher among the older age groups than
younger age groups. Average activity rates in a sports club were also greater for husbands
than wives, but declined with age.21
The estimates provide some evidence consistent with our core hypothesis. Young
husbands were more likely to be active in a social group or working men’s club if there was a
higher rate of activity among middle-aged persons (Table 3, column 1). Also, middle aged
husbands were more likely to be active if there was more activity among people aged 18–30,
or among people aged 51–59 (Table 4, column 1). We did not get similar results for
husband’s sports club activity: there were no statistically significant associations with the
regional-mean activity variables (Tables 3–5, column 3). The results for wives differ from
those for husbands in that the evidence supportive of the externality hypothesis concerns the
probability of sports club activity rather than social group or working men’s club activity.
Higher chances of sports club activity among young and middle-aged women were associated
with greater sports club activity among people aged 51–59, though the relevant coefficients
are less statistically significant than those for husbands (Tables 4 and 5, column 4).
21
<Tables 3, 4, and 5 near here>
Section 2 noted that our model also applies to single people, and some evidence
consistent with our interdependence hypothesis was also found in similar models estimated
using samples of employed single householders (results available on request). Men aged 31–
50 were more likely to be active in a sports club the greater the activity rate among people
aged 51–59, and women aged 31–50 were more likely to be active in a social group the
greater the activity rate among people aged 18–30.
The cross-equation correlation structure had a similar pattern for all three age groups,
one that is consistent with our core hypothesis. Other things being equal, the propensities to
be active in a social group or working men’s club for a husband and for a wife have a strong
positive and statistically significant correlation (ρ 21 ≈  0.6). Similarly, the propensities to be
active in a sports club for a husband and for a wife are also strongly correlated (ρ 43 ≈  0.5). As
expected also, the propensity for a husband to be engaged in one of the activities is positively
correlated with his propensity to be engaged in the other activity (ρ 31  ≈  0.3). The
corresponding correlation for wives is also positive though noticeably smaller (ρ 42 ≈  0.1), and
                                                                                                                                                       
20 Statistical identification in this sort of situation has been analysed by Manski (1993) as an example of a more
general ‘reflection problem’.
21 We reran all the regressions for each age group also including the regional-mean activity rate of the relevant
age group in addition to the rates for the other two groups. Results changed little. The most noticeable change
was that the coefficient on the own age group variable was invariably positive, as expected, and often
statistically significant. However, given the earlier arguments about the reflection problem, we do not place any
emphasis on these results. Our results were also robust to potential ‘Moulton’ effects. Moulton (1990) argued
that, in linear regressions for individuals that used cross-individual averages as explanatory variables, standard
error estimates for those variables may be biased downwards if their calculation ignored potential correlations22
precisely estimated only for the middle-aged group. The cross-activity cross-partner
correlations (ρ 41, ρ 32) are positive and small, but not statistically significant. Taken together,
these results are consistent with the hypothesis that husbands and wives try to spend time
together but, as is often the case, we cannot distinguish causation from these correlations.
One hypothesis is that couples do similar things in order to spend time together, while the
alternative hypothesis is that people who do similar things and spend time together tend to get
married. Our results are consistent with both arguments.
The estimates for the control variables are of secondary interest and, as it happened,
virtually all had statistically insignificant associations with activity propensities. One
exception was that husbands and wives with university degrees were consistently less likely
to be active in a social group or working men’s club (in all age groups), and husbands and
wives with no educational qualifications were consistently less likely to be active in a sports
club (middle and older age groups). We interpret these results as evidence of a class bias in
associative activity. Putnam (2000) has argued strongly that associational life and education
are positively correlated.
7. Discussion: the implications of leisure coordination
Why might it matter if the hypothesis of this paper is true – that an individual’s time
use choices are typically contingent on the time use choices of others, because the utility
derived from leisure time often benefits from the presence of companionable others? One set
of answers concerns the welfare effects of economy-wide increases in work hours.
Within the OECD, there are significant differences in the trend and level of average
work hours. For example, from 1980 to 2000, average working hours per adult (ages 15–64)
rose by 234 hours in the USA to 1476 hours, but fell by 170 hours in Germany to 973, and by
210 hours in France to 957: see Osberg (2003a). Compared to the USA, this difference
amounts to 9.7 more hours of work per adult per week for Germany, and 9.9 more hours of
work per adult per week for France. These differences in average working hours are due in
part to inter-country differences in probability of employment (i.e. differences at the
extensive margin of labour supply), in part to differences in common entitlements to paid
vacations and public holidays, and in part to differences in the hours of work of employees.
                                                                                                                                                       
across individuals within the groups used for the aggregation. We re-estimated the models with region as the
cluster variable rather than the couple. Results were remarkably similar to those reported in Tables 3–5.23
However, whatever their origins, they are large enough to motivate a concern over their
larger social implications.
It has long been acknowledged that one reason why GDP per capita is a poor measure
of economic well being is because it does not recognize the opportunity cost in lost leisure
time to individuals of increases in average money income which stem from longer average
work hours. If, in addition, an increase in the average work hours of everyone else has an
adverse externality on the marginal utility of each person’s leisure, then aggregate well-being
falls by more than the cost of foregone wages when average working time rises.
Our model also suggests that there may be multiple equilibria in labour supply, some
of which generate lower aggregate utility. In Figure 2, for example, we presented two
possible equilibria in individual hours of paid labour supply (H* and H**), each conditional
on the average working time of others. The ‘high work’ equilibrium (H**) has
unambiguously lower total utility. Societies which are better able to co-ordinate the level and
timing of paid working hours may be better off in aggregate, because they enable their
citizens to enjoy more satisfying social lives. To be specific, our externality hypothesis
suggests that North Americans may work more hours than Europeans partly because they are
more likely to have ‘nobody to play with’ – because other North Americans are also working
more hours – and that they are worse off as a result.
Moreover, our model draws an explicit, micro-behavioural link between decreasing
social contacts and rising hours of work. If authors such as Putnam (1993, 2000) and the
OECD (2001) are correct in stressing the dependence of social capital on associational life
and the importance of social capital for social and economic development, the costs of a high-
work/low-social life equilibrium may be substantial – in terms of market income as well as in
utility. Knack and Keefer (1997) are representative of an empirical literature which argues
that localities with an active civic society and associational life (and more generally a dense
network of social ties among individuals, and a high level of trust) have higher growth rates
of GDP per capita. This relationship has been argued to be due to a number of possible
influences: for example lower transactions costs in capital, labour and product markets, more
effective governance, lower costs of crime, labour conflict and political uncertainty, better
health outcomes and so on (see Osberg, 2003b). Whatever the channel of influence, it
suggests that, although working longer hours may accelerate growth in GDP per capita in the
short run, both income and social life may suffer in the longer run.24
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Figure 2. Activity rates in associative activities, regional averages by age group
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Table 1. Synchronisation of spouses’ work times*,




















All working couples 51.2 100.0 46.4 100.0
Usual time of day for paid work (husband)
Mornings only 25.8   1.4   6.9   2.5
Afternoons only   0   0.3   0   0.2
During the day 67.1 71.8 62.5 72.0
Evenings only   4.3   0.5   1.5   0.5
At night   5.4   2.1   2.2   2.5
Both lunchtimes/evenings 23.8   0.2   0   0.4
Other times of the day   0   0.3   0   0.3
Rotating shifts   9.2 13.4   7.3   11.4
Varies or no pattern   9.6   4.7   2.0   5.5
Other 13.5   4.9   5.1   4.5
Daytimes and evenings 16.6   0.3   0   0.3
Number of children aged <16 years in household
None 60.0 51.9 52.2 52.5
    1 48.3 21.2 45.1 21.1
    2 38.8 20.5 36.6 20.4
    3 28.8   5.4 34.6   5.3
    4 26.2   0.9 29.7   0.8
* Synchronisation occurred where the usual time of work reported by the husband and wife
coincided. Numbers of cases with 5+ children were too small to tabulate. Data weighted using
BHPS cross-section respondent weights. Real couples: unweighted N = 2420 husbands (9857
husband-wave observations). Pseudo couples: unweighted N = 2388 husbands (9480 husband-
wave observations). Creation of pseudo-couples based on matching described in main text.29
Table 2. The probability that a husband and wife work at same of the day,
by whether household has children
Regressor No children
Aged < 16






Husband’s wage rate (£/week) –0.004 (1.00)   0.009 (2.16)
Wife’s wage rate (£/week)   0.033 (6.30)   0.015 (4.74)
Husband’s work hours (hours/week) –0.001 (0.79)   0.000 (0.02)
Wife’s work hours (hours/week)   0.010 (7.16)   0.019 (13.8)
Husband worked during the day   0.895 (24.7)   0.612 (21.6)
Proportion of men working unsocial
hours (region)   0.798 (0.93)   0.144 (0.17)
Proportion of women working unsocial
hours (region) –0.978 (0.92) –1.228 (1.02)
Youngest child aged < 6 years –0.012 (3.29)
Number of children –0.067 (3.20)
Mean of dependent variable 0.61 0.42
Log-likelihood –1,797 –1,698
N (couple-waves)   4,922   4,375
N (couples)   1,560   1,230
Random effects probit estimates. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the
regressors; |t-ratio| is asymptotic t-ratio for the underlying coefficient. Regressions also
included controls for: husband’s age and educational qualifications, cohabiting rather
than married, survey year (dummy variables), local unemployment rate, industry of
husband’s main job (dummy variables for the ten major SIC groups), and firm size
(eight categories).30
Table 3. The probabilities of associative activity for husbands and wives
(husbands aged 18–30)
Regressor Pr(active in a social group or working
men’s club)









Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio|
Mean regional social group
activity rate
31–50 years   6.577 (2.69)   1.550 (0.64)
51–59 years –1.214 (0.97) –2.470 (1.72)
Mean regional sports club
activity rate
31–50 years   0.240 (0.16)   0.278 (0.16)
51–59 years –0.773 (0.50)   2.485 (1.43)
Cross-equation correlations
ρ 21   0.597 (9.58)
ρ 31   0.254 (4.67)
ρ 41   0.077 (1.24)
ρ 32   0.074 (1.04)
ρ 42   0.101 (1.33)
ρ 43   0.485 (10.89)
Mean of dependent variable 0.11 0.05 0.36 0.22
Log pseudo-likelihood –2,254
N (couple-waves)   1,453
Multivariate probit estimates, derived by simulated maximum likelihood (number of random draws = 45),
with standard errors adjusted to account for repeated observations per couple across waves. Each regression
also included controls for respondent’s age, wage rate, educational qualifications, industry of main job
(dummy variables for the ten major SIC groups), firm size (eight categories), and the number of children
aged < 16, whether the youngest child was aged < 6, whether couple cohabiting rather than married, regional
prevalence of unsocial work hours, and survey year (dummy variables).31
Table 4. The probabilities of associative activity for husbands and wives
(husbands aged 31–50)
Regressor Pr(active in a social group or working
men’s club)









Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio|
Mean regional social group
activity rate
18–30 years   5.221 (3.40)   2.368 (1.41)
51–59 years   1.458 (1.81)   0.137 (0.13)
Mean regional sports club
activity rate
18–30 years   0.847 (0.79)   1.907 (1.84)
51–59 years –0.927 (0.77)   2.222 (1.67)
Cross-equation correlations
ρ 21   0.581 (15.44)
ρ 31   0.197 (5.04)
ρ 41   0.057 (1.29)
ρ 32   0.068 (1.46)
ρ 42   0.126 (2.47)
ρ 43   0.482 (14.91)
Mean of dependent variable 0.16 0.08 0.30 0.16
Log pseudo-likelihood –6,305
N (couple-waves)   3,893
Multivariate probit estimates, derived by simulated maximum likelihood (number of random draws = 75), with
standard errors adjusted to account for repeated observations per couple across waves. Each regression also
included the controls listed in the note to Table 3.32
Table 5. The probabilities of associative activity for husbands and wives
(husbands aged 51–59)
Regressor Pr(active in a social group or working
men’s club)









Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio| Coeff. |t-ratio|
Mean regional social group
activity rate
18–30 years   1.651 (0.35) –3.643 (0.76)
31–50 years   2.775 (0.55)   1.405 (0.37)
Mean regional sports club
activity rate
18–30 years   2.208 (0.93)   1.254 (0.47)
31–50 years   3.826 (1.51)   5.074 (1.74)
Cross-equation correlations
ρ 21   0.632 (9.31)
ρ 31   0.152 (2.01)
ρ 41   0.094 (1.01)
ρ 32   0.015 (0.16)
ρ 42   0.119 (1.07)
ρ 43   0.407 (4.99)
Mean of dependent variable 0.19 0.11 0.23 0.11
Log pseudo-likelihood –1,304
N (couple-waves)     877
Multivariate probit estimates, derived by simulated maximum likelihood (number of random draws = 35), with
standard errors adjusted to account for repeated observations per couple across waves. Each regression also
included the controls listed in the note to Table 3.